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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Professor Schwed takes as his starting point the culture-ladenness of argumentation. He 
observes three senses in which the concepts of “argument” and “argumentation” are 
dependent on culture. Firstly, the anthropological: different societies employ different 
argumentational practices to different ends. They make different assumptions about what 
arguments are, how and when they should be deployed, and when they succeed. 
Secondly, the sub-cultural: within any society, most conspicuously our own, there are 
different groups with different ideas about argument, such as lawyers, doctors, 
politicians, scientists, and so forth. Thirdly, the theoretical: different argumentation 
theorists have different ideas about the nature of their subject, and draw upon resources 
from many contrasting disciplinary traditions. (One initial observation is that, if anything, 
Professor Schwed understates the problem. There are many other factors upon which our 
argumentational concepts may depend. For example: language, innate cognitive 
structures, gender, or our own personal choices (Swoyer 2003, §3).) This welter of 
confusion lends credence to a sceptical thesis: there are no culturally independent 
standards of argument appraisal. Two obvious, but equally unattractive, responses to 
such scepticism present themselves. In the most general terms: (a) Pretend everything is 
O.K.; (b) Give up. As Professor Schwed puts it, these are  
 
the alternatives of continuing the search for universally justified standards for rationality and truth 
on the one hand, and […] no hope for any sense for the concepts of rationality and truth on the 
other (p. 10).  
 
He suggests that Wittgenstein offers us a way to pass between the horns of this dilemma. 
 However, there is some scope for confusion as to the exact location of these 
horns, and thereby what it would mean to pass between them. Professor Schwed 
describes the choice in different words at several different places in his paper. So, in 
addition to the passage just quoted, we are variously told that the choice is “between 
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rationalism and nihilism” (p. 10), between “the unattainable concept of rationality on the 
one hand with the rhetoric of arguments from an audience-centered perspective on the 
other hand” (p. 3), and that  
 
either there are universal standards against which the reasonableness of arguments can be 
evaluated or, conversely, that there are no determinate standards against which arguments can be 
evaluated, and hence no methods by which disputes can be rationally resolved (p. 1).  
 
In each case, the first option is quite clear: this is the appeal to objective standards that 
Professor Schwed insists are unattainable. Let us call this rationalism. The harder 
question is whether the second option represents the abandonment of all standards of 
rationality, which I shall call nihilism, or just the abandonment of universal standards of 
rationality, which I shall call relativism. Hence my first question is whether Professor 
Schwed is proposing that we adopt relativism as a middle ground between rationalism 
and nihilism, or that we find some other middle ground between relativism and 
rationalism. If he is suggesting the latter, he is in good, if demanding, company: as Chris 
Swoyer observes  
 
many writers now advise moving ‘beyond relativism’ (many books, chapters, and articles bear this 
phrase in the title), counseling us to steer a course between the Scylla of relativism, on the one 
side, and the Charybdis of an over-simplified absolutism, on the other. Finding such a course is 
easier said than done, however, and there is more agreement on the desirability of such a project 
than on how to carry it out. (Swoyer 2003, §5.10) 
 
Professor Schwed’s own references to relativism do not settle this question. On the one 
hand, we are told that one of the alternatives to be avoided is a “relativist point of view” 
(p. 3), but on the other that the position he favours carries a “relativistic aura” (p. 8). Of 
course, relativism is a broad church. I shall assume that his goal is a form of relativism 
that does as much justice as possible to all our intuitions: both that of the objectivity of 
reason, and that of its culture-ladenness. For what it’s worth, that would be my goal too. 
 
2. RATIONALITY AS LANGUAGE-GAME  
 
Professor Schwed finds in the later Wittgenstein “a call for a change of perspective in the 
traditional understanding of the concept of rationality” (p. 5). His particular focus is on 
Wittgenstein’s concept of the “language-game,” in which Prof. Schwed finds “a more 
fluid, more diversified, and more activity-oriented perspective on language” (p. 5). Hence 
he argues that  
 
the study of rationality should be fixed in the study of language-games, which shifts the traditional 
focus from the human being that pretends to be rational to her activities in the framework of a 
language-game (p. 6).  
 
Thus  
 
a person is not rational but her behaviour is rational due to her participating in a specific language-
game, which involves the concepts in the reason/rational family. It is the language-game that 
manifests a rational behaviour and not the person herself. (p. 6) 
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Language-games embody practices, and many concepts that we mistakenly suppose to be 
universal are actually relative to these practices. Thus Wittgenstein’s approach embeds 
the concept of rationality in practice. Rather than seek universal rules of rationality we 
must acknowledge that these rules are only to be found in particular language-games. 
This picture raises two questions. How are these rules implemented, and where does this 
relativism figure on the spectrum of positions from rationalism to nihilism? The first 
question leads us into the vexed issue of rule-following. Professor Schwed warns us that 
 
there is no fact of the matter here regarding a rigid definition of what it means to act in accordance 
with a rule or in conflict with it and Wittgenstein insists on obfuscating the whole issue of rule 
following (p. 7).  
 
With due trepidation, I shall attempt a clarification. Wittgenstein poses the problem as 
follows: “no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of 
action could be made out to accord with the rule” (PI, §201). At base, this is the 
observation that the choice of rules will be underdetermined by any finite amount of data, 
an idea which can be traced back at least as far as Leibniz (Goldstein 1999, p. 76). 
Wittgenstein’s solution to this problem is to invert the conceptual priority of rules and 
practice (or, better: to point out that we had it the wrong way round). We do not start out 
with a set of rules and then try to behave in accordance with them, we start out with a 
practice, and only after we have grasped it do we try to capture it in a system of rules. 
Wittgenstein says this in his next point—“And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice” 
(PI, §202)—but very concisely, and in the course of doing something else. He makes the 
underlying point more explicit elsewhere, for example in On Certainty:  
 
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain 
propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our 
acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game (OC, §204).  
 
(If this account is correct, then Professor Schwed’s observation that “What really gives 
the practices their stability is that people agree in their interpretations of the rules” (p. 11) 
can’t be right, unless interpretation is understood in the artificial sense of “the 
substitution of one expression of the rule for another” (PI, §201). If people agree it will 
be because they share a practice, not a point of view about how to interpret rules.) Thus, 
on Professor Schwed’s Wittgensteinian account, rationality is ultimately grounded in 
practice. But what are these practices? An answer to the second question, and an 
assessment of just how relativist all this has turned out, will depend on the nature of, and 
relationship between, these practices, or “forms of life.” Wittgenstein grants his 
language-games a significant degree of autonomy:  
 
We are not, however, regarding the language-games which we describe as incomplete parts of a 
language, but as languages complete in themselves, as complete systems of human communication 
(BB, p. 81).  
 
Professor Schwed follows suit, concluding that  
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Wittgenstein shows that the meaning of ‘reasoning’ or ‘being rational’ is divergent and depends on 
forms of life; it is divergent because of contrasts between groups of people and historical periods, 
between different social structures and so forth, and in short, because of culture (p. 9).  
 
This suggests a full-blooded relativism and little hope of a rapprochement with 
rationalism. However, I shall conclude by suggesting that Professor Schwed’s 
Wittgensteinian characterization of rationality can be brought more into tune with our 
intuitions of the universality and objectivity of reason. I shall begin by agreeing that 
reason can best be understood in terms of practice, and that it is a fragmented concept: 
many different practices correspond to different facets of rationality. However, there are 
several factors that count in favour of universality. Firstly, practices are subject to strong 
external selective pressures. Only those practices that aid human flourishing are likely to 
endure and become widespread. Secondly, some practices are very widespread indeed, 
perhaps encompassing all of humanity or at least the individuals normally thought 
rational. Thirdly, even where practices seem to diverge, they frequently share common 
features and components. In particular, ostensibly profoundly divergent practices can 
often be understood as intelligible in terms of a common framework. In the case of 
rationality, some central concepts in argumentation theory, such as the argumentation 
scheme, may be steps towards the articulation of this framework. Where the framework is 
shared, the disagreement is one of degree. (Of course, the framework must itself be 
understood in terms of practice, if scepticism about rule-following is to be avoided. 
Hence this point is a refinement of the last.) Finally, evaluative judgments that can only 
be made within specific practices, may nevertheless command respect amongst people at 
large. As Martha Nussbaum observes in somewhat different circumstances,  
 
The fact that a good and virtuous decision is context-sensitive does not imply that it is right only 
relative to, or inside, a limited context, any more than the fact that a good navigational judgment is 
sensitive to particular weather conditions shows that it is correct only in a local or relational sense. 
It is right absolutely, objectively, from anywhere in the human world, to attend to the particular 
features of one’s context; and the person who so attends and who chooses accordingly is making 
[…] the humanly correct decision, period. (Nussbaum 1988, p. 45) 
 
This picture is still relativist in some sense. It is expressly limited to human reason, and 
likely excludes some of the more esoteric human language-games which might be 
considered rational by their participants. Much of it turns on empirical claims, and is to 
that extent provisional. But it does have the merit of explaining the diversity of forms 
which reason can take, while respecting our intuition that the rational should be 
(practically) universal.  
 
          Link to paper 
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